Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Desire to be God (1)” from Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: The Wisdom Library, 1957), pp. 59-62.

The most discerning ethicists have shown how a desire reaches beyond itself.  Pascal believed that he could discover in hunting, for example, or tennis, or in a hundred other occupations, the need of being diverted.  He revealed that in a n activity which would be absurd if reduced to itself, there was a meaning which transcended it; that is, an indication which referred to the reality of man in general and to his condition.  Similarly, Stendhal in spite of his attachment to ideologist, and Proust in spite of his intellectualistic and analytical tendencies, have shown that love a jealousy can not be reduced to the strict desire of possessing a particular woman, but that these emotions aim at laying hold of the world in its entirety through the woman.  This is the meaning of Stendhal’s crystallization, and it is precisely for this reason that Love as Stendhal describes it appears as a mode of being in the world.  Love is a fundamental relation of the for-itself to the world and to itself (selfness) through a particular woman; the woman represents only a conducting body which is placed in the circuit.  These analyses may be inexact or only partially true; nevertheless they make us suspect a method other than pure analytical description.  In the same way Catholic novelists immediately see in carnal love its surpassing toward God—in Don Juan, “the eternally unsatisfied,” in sin, “the place empty of God.”  There  is not question of finding again an abstract behind the concrete; the impulse toward God is no less concrete than the impulse toward a particular woman.  On the contrary, it is a matter of rediscovering under the partial and incomplete aspects of the subject the veritable concreteness which can be only the totality of his impulse toward being, his original relation to himself, to the world, and to the Other, in the unity of internal relation and of a fundamental project.  This impulse can be only purely individual and unique.  Far from estranging us from the person, a Bo0urget’s analysis, for example, does in constituting the individual by means of a summation of general maxims, this impulse will not lead us to find in the need of writing—and of writing particularly books—the need of activity in general.  On the contrary, rejecting equally the theory of malleable clay and that of the bundle of drives, we will discover the individual person in the initial project which constitutes him.  It is for this reason  that the irreducibility of the result attained will be revealed as self-evident, not because it is the poorest and the most abstract but because it is the richest.  The intuition here will be accompanied by an individual fullness.